In February 2026, a group of women stood outside Kenya’s Parliament in Nairobi holding photographs of their sons and brothers. Among them was Winnie Rose Wambui, who was searching for her brother, Samuel Maina.
He had travelled to Russia believing that he had secured a job as a mall security guard. The last contact his family had with him was a distress voice message recorded from a forest.
Wambui’s story is not an isolated case. It has become part of a wider controversy surrounding the recruitment of Africans into Russia’s war against Ukraine.
According to Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, at least 3,000 Africans from 37 countries have been recorded as having fought, or still fighting, for Russia.
The figures point to a growing dimension of Russia’s relationship with Africa, in which longstanding diplomatic, military and economic ties are increasingly intersecting with the war in Ukraine.
Russia has historically maintained strong links with many African countries, dating back to the Soviet Union’s support for liberation movements.
However, the nature of those relationships appears to be changing. In some fragile states, particularly those governed by military juntas, Russian-linked networks have established deep security and economic relationships.
In countries with stronger institutions, cooperation has generally remained more cautious and focused on specific interests.
Whatever the nature of the relationship, African countries face potential costs. These include exposure to secondary sanctions, complicated relations with Western partners and, increasingly, the recruitment of their citizens into a foreign war.
The question is therefore no longer simply whether African countries should maintain relations with Moscow. The more important question is whether those relationships are producing sufficient benefits for African citizens and states to justify the growing risks.
The recruitment scandal
Reports from several African countries describe a similar pattern. Young Africans searching for employment are offered what appear to be lucrative jobs in Russia.
Recruiters may promise salaries of about $3,500 a month, together with substantial bonuses. The advertised positions can involve driving, security work or technical services.
For someone struggling to find employment at home, such an opportunity can be extremely attractive.
The problem begins after the recruits arrive in Russia. Some have reportedly had their passports confiscated and been presented with military contracts written in Russian.
In cases where recruits do not speak the language, there may be no independent lawyer or translator available to explain the documents.
Some are subsequently pressured into signing contracts and are sent for military training before being deployed to the front lines in Ukraine.
Even those who knowingly sign up for military service because of the promised financial rewards have reportedly complained that they did not receive the payments they were promised.
The human cost has been severe. Research cited by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies has put the fatality rate among some African recruits at 22 percent, while other reports indicate that training can last as little as one to one-and-a-half weeks.
Russia rejects allegations that it is illegally recruiting Africans, maintaining that enlistment is voluntary and lawful. However, investigations have documented recruitment involving state-linked companies, intermediaries, military structures and, in some cases, diplomatic networks.
Reports have also raised questions about the role of other Russian institutions operating in Africa. The Russian Orthodox Church, for example, has expanded its presence in several African countries in recent years, prompting scrutiny over whether religious and cultural networks are also helping facilitate movement to Russia.
The controversy has reached politically prominent families. Former South African President Jacob Zuma’s daughter, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, has faced allegations relating to the recruitment of South Africans for Russia’s war effort, although the circumstances and responsibility remain contested.
Russia’s expanding presence in Africa
Russia’s relationship with Africa has deep historical roots.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported liberation movements in countries including Angola and Zimbabwe and presented itself as an opponent of Western colonialism. That history continues to influence how Moscow is perceived in parts of Africa.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has taken on an additional strategic dimension.
Western governments and researchers have accused Russia of using African gold, shipping networks and financial channels to circumvent sanctions. Russian-linked networks operating in countries such as the Central African Republic and Mali have also become involved in security arrangements and mining activities.
The Wagner Group, and subsequently the Africa Corps, have been central to Russia’s security presence in parts of the continent.
The Central African Republic, Mali and Libya have hosted significant Russian-linked military deployments, while more than 40 African countries maintain some form of military cooperation with Moscow.
Russia’s economic relationships with Africa extend beyond security. Countries such as Egypt and Algeria have long been important buyers of Russian military equipment, while countries including South Africa and Benin have relied on Russian fertiliser supplies.
At the same time, financial networks linked to Russia are expanding across the continent. The Kremlin-backed A7 network, for example, has been identified by researchers as part of a broader effort involving financial transactions and sanctions evasion.
This means that Russia’s African strategy cannot be understood solely in military terms. It increasingly involves security, mining, trade, finance, energy and political influence.
What does Africa gain?
The central issue for African governments should be whether these relationships produce tangible and sustainable benefits for their citizens.
Russia presents itself as an anti-colonial partner and frequently contrasts its approach with what it describes as Western hypocrisy. For governments seeking alternatives to traditional Western partnerships, this message can be politically attractive.
But the benefits of closer Russian engagement are not necessarily distributed evenly.
Researchers have questioned whether Russian-backed security deployments have produced lasting improvements in stability in countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic and Libya.
There are also concerns that economic benefits from mining and other activities can become concentrated among political and security elites.
At the same time, African countries can face consequences when their companies, banks, ships or financial institutions become involved in transactions that attract Western sanctions.
South Africa, for example, has previously warned that secondary sanctions against its financial institutions could have serious economic consequences.
This creates a difficult situation for African governments. Maintaining relations with Russia may provide access to military equipment, fertiliser, investment or political support, but those relationships can also expose countries to diplomatic and economic pressure from other major partners.
How African countries are responding
African governments have begun responding to the recruitment controversy, although their approaches differ.
In Kenya, public pressure over citizens recruited into the Russian military eventually resulted in discussions with Moscow over stopping the recruitment of Kenyans.
Kenyan authorities have also taken action against recruitment agencies suspected of misleading citizens about employment opportunities in Russia.
South Africa has acknowledged cases involving its citizens who travelled to Russia and subsequently became involved in the war. The government has engaged affected families and warned citizens against becoming involved in foreign conflicts.
Nigeria has similarly warned its citizens against fighting in foreign conflicts after reports emerged that Nigerians had been misled or coerced into signing Russian military service contracts before being deployed to combat zones.
These responses suggest that African governments are becoming increasingly aware of the risks.
The issue now requires a broader continental conversation.
If Africans are being recruited to fight in a war thousands of kilometres from home, while African resources and financial systems are allegedly being used to circumvent international sanctions, governments need to examine whether the existing arrangements are serving their national interests.
The question is not whether African countries should choose Russia over the West, or the West over Russia. African states have the sovereign right to maintain relations with whichever countries they consider beneficial.
But sovereignty also requires governments to protect their citizens and ensure that international partnerships do not expose them to unnecessary risks.
The European opportunity
The changing nature of Russia’s relationship with Africa also presents a challenge for Europe.
For decades, European governments have maintained extensive political and economic relationships with Africa, but many African governments have increasingly complained that Europe has not offered partnerships that adequately reflect their changing priorities.
Ukraine has already recognised the importance of strengthening its diplomatic presence on the continent. Since 2022, Kyiv has expanded its diplomatic engagement and opened new missions in Africa, although several remain understaffed.
European countries could similarly strengthen their engagement, not simply by asking African governments to distance themselves from Russia, but by offering credible alternatives.
That could include greater investment, expanded trade, scholarships, technology partnerships, infrastructure cooperation and security relationships based on the needs identified by African governments themselves.
Europe could also work more closely with African governments to combat deceptive recruitment schemes that target unemployed young people.
The lesson from the Russian recruitment controversy is that geopolitical competition does not take place only in presidential palaces and diplomatic conferences.
It can reach ordinary families, particularly young Africans searching for employment.
For African governments, the priority should therefore be clear: protect citizens, safeguard national resources and ensure that foreign partnerships produce measurable benefits.
Russia remains an important global power and African countries are unlikely to sever relations with Moscow simply because of pressure from the West.
But neither should African governments accept arrangements that place their citizens at risk or expose their economies to avoidable consequences.
Africa has the right to maintain independent foreign policies. That independence, however, should be accompanied by careful scrutiny of what every international partnership actually delivers.
The growing controversy over Russian military recruitment provides an opportunity for African governments to reassess their relationships with Moscow and ask a straightforward question: what does Africa gain, what does it risk, and who ultimately pays the price?
Courtesy of K
